The growing field of evo-devo is increasingly demonstrating the complexity of steps involved in genetic, intracellular regulatory, and extracellular environmental control of the development of phenotypes. A key result of such work is an account for the remarkable plasticity of organismal form in many species based on relatively minor changes in regulation of highly conserved genes and genetic processes. Accounting for behavioral plasticity is of similar potential interest but has received far less attention. Of particular interest is plasticity in communication (...) systems, where human language represents an ultimate target for research. The present paper considers plasticity of language capabilities in a comparative framework, focusing attention on examples of a remarkable fact: Whereas there exist design features of mature human language that have never been observed to occur in non-humans in the wild, many of these features can be developed to notable extents when non-humans are enculturated through human training. These examples of enculturated developmental plasticity across extremely diverse taxa suggest, consistent with the evo-devo theme of highly conserved processes in evolution, that human language is founded in part on cognitive capabilities that are indeed ancient and that even modern humans show self-organized emergence of many language capabilities in the context of rich enculturation, built on the special social/ecological history of the hominin line. Human culture can thus be seen as a regulatory system encouraging language development in the context of a cognitive background with many highly conserved features. (shrink)

Deciphering nonhuman communication – particularly nonhuman vocal communication – has been a longstanding human quest. We are, for example, fascinated by the songs of birds and whales, the grunts of apes, the barks of dogs, and the croaks of frogs; we wonder about their potential meaning and their relationship to human language. Do these utterances express little more than emotional states, or do they convey actual bits and bytes of concrete information? Humans’ numerous attempts to decipher nonhuman systems have, however, (...) progressed slowly. We still wonder why only a small number of species are capable of vocal learning, a trait that, because it allows for innovation and adaptation, would seem to be a prerequisite for most language-like abilities. Humans have also attempted to teach nonhumans elements of our system, using both vocal and nonvocal systems. The rationale for such training is that the extent of success in instilling symbolic reference provides some evidence for, at the very least, the cognitive underpinnings of parallels between human and nonhuman communication systems. However, separating acquisition of reference from simple object-label association is not a simple matter, as reference begins with such associations, and the point at which true reference emerges is not always obvious. I begin by discussing these points and questions, predominantly from the viewpoint of someone studying avian abilities. I end by examining the question posed by Premack: do nonhumans that have achieved some level of symbolic reference then process information differently from those that have not? I suggest the answer is likely “yes,” giving examples from my research on Grey parrots. (shrink)

Grey parrots do not acquire referential English labels when tutored with videotapes displayed on CRT screens if socially isolated, reward for attempted labels is possible, trainers direct birds’ attention to the monitor, live video feed avoids habituation or one trainer repeats labels produced on video and rewards label attempts. Because birds learned referential labels from live tutor pairs in concurrent sessions, we concluded that video failed because input lacked live social interaction and modeling. Recent studies, however, suggest that standard CRT (...) monitor flickering could instead have prevented learning. Using an LCD monitor, we found that eliminating flickering did not enable birds to learn from video under conditions of limited social interaction. Results emphasize the role of social interaction in referential label learning and may generalize to other systems. (shrink)

Grey parrots do not acquire referential English labels when tutored with videotapes displayed on CRT screens if socially isolated, reward for attempted labels is possible, trainers direct birds’ attention to the monitor, live video feed avoids habituation or one trainer repeats labels produced on video and rewards label attempts. Because birds learned referential labels from live tutor pairs in concurrent sessions, we concluded that video failed because input lacked live social interaction and modeling. Recent studies, however, suggest that standard CRT (...) monitor flickering could instead have prevented learning. Using an LCD monitor, we found that eliminating flickering did not enable birds to learn from video under conditions of limited social interaction. Results emphasize the role of social interaction in referential label learning and may generalize to other systems. (shrink)

Explaining the transition from nonhuman to human behavior is a major scientific problem. Penn et al. argue for discontinuous evolution; they review many relevant papers but miss some that disagree with their stance. Given the shifting ground on which Penn et al.'s theories are based, and the likelihood of future studies providing additional information on continuities, a more open approach to continuity is warranted.

The field of animal-computer interfaces has a longer history than one might at first suppose. In this Introduction, I first discuss some of the early attempts to integrate computers into the study of animal cognition, communication, and behavior and how they provided the groundwork for subsequent research in nonhuman-computer interfaces. I then summarize the various contributions to this special issue, emphasizing how they provide a snapshot into the current state of the field. I close by emphasizing the value of this (...) work but also by suggesting some potential pitfalls of which we must also be aware. (shrink)

We disagree with two of Rendell and Whitehead's assertions. Culture may be an ancestral characteristic of terrestrial cetacean ancestors; not derived via marine variability, modern cetacean mobility, or any living cetacean social structure. Furthermore, evidence for vocal behavior as culture, social stability, and cognitive ability, is richer in birds than Rendell and Whitehead portray and comparable to that of cetaceans and primates.

The study of animal behavior, and particularly avian behavior, has advanced significantly in the past 50 years. In the early 1960s, both ethologists and psychologists were likely to see birds as simple automatons, incapable of complex cognitive processing. Indeed, the term “avian cognition“ was considered an oxymoron. Avian social interaction was also seen as based on rigid, if sometimes complicated, patterns. The possible effect of social interaction on cognition, or vice versa, was therefore something almost never discussed. Two paradigm shifts—one (...) concerning animal cognition and one concerning social interaction—began to change perceptions in, respectively, the early 1970s and 1980s, but only more recently have researchers actively investigated how these two areas intersect in the study of avian behavior. The fruits of such intersection can be seen in the various papers for this special issue. I provide some brief background material before addressing the striking findings of current projects. In some cases, researchers have adapted early classic methods and in other cases have devised new paradigms, but in all instances have demonstrated avian capacities that were once thought to be the exclusive domain of humans or at least nonhuman primates. Keywords: avian cognition; avian social learning; avian observational learning; avian communication. (shrink)

The study of animal behavior, and particularly avian behavior, has advanced significantly in the past 50 years. In the early 1960s, both ethologists and psychologists were likely to see birds as simple automatons, incapable of complex cognitive processing. Indeed, the term “avian cognition” was considered an oxymoron. Avian social interaction was also seen as based on rigid, if sometimes complicated, patterns. The possible effect of social interaction on cognition, or vice versa, was therefore something almost never discussed. Two paradigm shifts—one (...) concerning animal cognition and one concerning social interaction—began to change perceptions in, respectively, the early 1970s and 1980s, but only more recently have researchers actively investigated how these two areas intersect in the study of avian behavior. The fruits of such intersection can be seen in the various papers for this special issue. I provide some brief background material before addressing the striking findings of current projects. In some cases, researchers have adapted early classic methods and in other cases have devised new paradigms, but in all instances have demonstrated avian capacities that were once thought to be the exclusive domain of humans or at least nonhuman primates. Keywords: avian cognition; avian social learning; avian observational learning; avian communication. (shrink)

Viewing communication as a dynamic system is laudable; arguing that the approach is novel is questionable. Some researchers studying nonhuman communication other than ape language have been using such an approach for decades. A brief description of an avian system provides one such example. Interestingly, the dynamic social system described in the target article may have a developmental neuronal basis.

Biology can inspire robotic simulations of behavior and thus advance robotics, but the validity of drawing conclusions about real behavior from robotic models is questionable. Robotic models, particularly of learning, do not account, for example, for (a) exaptation: co-opting of previously evolved functions for new behavior, (b) learning through observation, (c) complex biological reality, or (d) limits on computational capacity.

Heyes argues that we need alternative experiments to study those animal abilities generally considered to involve “theory of mind.” The studies she proposes, however, have as many problems as those that she criticizes. Further interactions should exist among researchers examining these capacities before additional experiments are undertaken.

Much of the material MacNeilage cites to support his frame/content theory for the evolution of speech production in humans is not unique to mammals. Parallels can be drawn for comparable evolution of vocal flexibility (specifically the reproduction of human speech) in birds. I describe several such parallels and conclude that MacNeilage's hypotheses may have broader application than he envisioned.